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NOTES
PRICE V. NEAL AND DOUBLE FORGERIES
In 1762 the English Court decided the now famous case of
Price v. Nea/.1 In this case the drawee of two bills of exchange,
to which the drawer's name was forged, paid their face value to
a holder in due course and sought to recover the money on the
ground that payment was made under mistake of fact.
Recovery was denied. Lord Mlansfield stated that it was not
against good conscience for the defendant to retain the payment
which he had received in good faith and with.out negligence or
suspicion of the forgery. He seemed to feel that the plaintiff,
the drawee, was negligent in not discovering the forgery before
paying. But even assuming that the drawee was not negligent,
the court refused to shift the loss from one innocent party to
another equally innocent.
This decision was followed in Bank of United States v.
Bank of Georgia,2 decided in 1825, and was generally recognized
and followed in this country before the adoption of the
Negotiable Instruments Law. 3 It has been frequently stated
that the basis for this rule is the supposed negligence of the
bank in failing to detect the forgery and refuse payment.4
But there are more fundamental reasons which have led the
courts to adopt the rule. It has been held that since the bank
upon whom the check is drawn has, or is presumed to have,
means of ascertaining the genuineness of the drawer's signature,
while the bona fide holder is wholly without such means, this
inequality of footing between the holder and the bank furnishes
13 Burr. 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (1762).
2 23 U. S. (10 Wheat.) 333, 6 L. ed. 334 (1825).
1 Hoffman v. Bank of Milwaukee, 12 Wall. 181, 79 U. S. 181
(1870); Young & Son v. Lehman, 63 Ala. 519 (1879); First Bank v.
Ricker, 71 IIl. 439 (1874); National Bank v. Tappan, 6 Kan. 456

(1870); Deposit Bank of Georgetown v. Fayette National Bank,

90 Ky. 10 (1890); Comm. Bank v. First Bank, 30 Md. 11 (1869);
Bank of St. Albans v. Farmers & Mechanics Bank, 10 Vt. 141 (1838).
'Security and Commercial Say. Bank of San Diego v. So. Trust
and Commerce Bank, 74 Cal. App. 734, 241 Pac. 945 (1925); National
Bank of Rolla v. First Nat. Bank, 141 Mo. App. 719, 125 S. W. 513
(1910); People's Trust and Guaranty Co. of Hackensack v. Genden,
119 N. J. Eq. 249, 182 AUt. 25 (1936); First Nat. Bank v. Bank of
Cottage Grove, 59 Or. 388, 117 Pac. 293 (1911).
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justification for the rule.5 Also it is said that the rule should
be defended for the sake of commercial convenience and necessity. 6 Other courts have explained the rule by a theory of "final
settlement", stating that as between the drawee bank and good
faith holders, the bank is deemed the place of final settlement
where all prior mistakes and forgeries shall be corrected once
and for all and where, in the absence of objections, payment
should be treated as final.7 It has been generally accepted that
the rule of Price v. Neal was given legislative approval by the
adoption of Section 62 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.8
Although one jurisdiction has refused to interpret the term
"accepting" to include payment, 9 the vast majority relying on
precedent or statute hold that a drawee bank which pays a
forged check to a then innocent holder in due course cannot
recover. 10
However, there have been frequent expressions of dissatisfaction with the result of the rule since it is clear that facts
which gave rise to it 150 years ago no longer apply. It is
clearly a fiction to say that each receiving teller in modern
banking institutions should know the signature of each of
thousands of depositors or that it would be commercially possible
"Commercial and Savings Bank Co. v. Citizens Nat. Bank, 68 Ind.
App. 417, 120 N. E. 670, 672 (1918).
See First Nat. Bank v. U. S. Nat. Bank, 100 Or. 264, 197 Pac.
547, 551 (1921); Bank of Williamson v. McDowell County Bank, 66
W. Va.
545, 66 S. E. 761, 762, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 605 (1910).
7
First Nat. Bank of Marshalltown v. Marshalltown State Bank,
107 Iowa 327, 77 N.W. 1045, 44 L.R.A. 131 (1890); Germania Bank v.
Boutell, 60 Minn. 189, 62 N.W. 327, 27 L.R.A. 635 (1895).
s Section 62 provides: "The acceptor by accepting the instrument engages that he will pay it according to the tenor of his acceptance; and admits-(1) The existence of the drawer, the genuineness
of his signature, and his capacity and authority to draw the instrument; and (2) The existence of the payee and his then capacity to
indorse."
'Union National Bank v. Franklin National Bank, 249 Pa. 375,
94 Atl. 1085 (1915); Colonial Trust Co. v. National Bank of West
Pennsylvania, 50 Pa. Sup. Ct. 510 (1910).
"Security

Commercial & Sav. Bank v. Southern Trust & Com-

merce Bank, 74 Cal. App. 734, 241 Pac. 945 (1925); Louisa National

Bank v. Kentucky National Bank, 239 Ky. 300, 39 S. W. (2d) 497

(1931); Farmers Nat. Bank of Augusta v. Farmers and Traders Bank
of Maysville, 159 Ky. 141, 166 S. W. 986 (1914); McLendon v. Bank
of Advance, 188 Mo. App. 417, 174 S. W. 203 (1915); National Bank
of Commerce v. Mechanic's Am. Nat. Bank, 148 Mo. App. 1, 127 S. W.
429 (1910); National Bank of Rolla v. First National Bank of Salem,
141 Mo. App. 719, 125 S. W. 513 (1910); State Nat. Bank v. Bank of
Magdalena, 21 N. M. 653, 157 Pac. 498 (1916); Fidelity & Casualty
Co. of New York v. Planenscheck, 200 Wis. 304, 227 N. W. 387 (1929).
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to check and compare the signature on every instrument
presented for payment. It has been pointed out that the rule
is applied where the paying bank has not been negligent, such
as where the forgery was so skillfully executed that it naturally
tended to deceive." Also, the rule which places the loss on the
drawee bank is a violation of the general principle applicable to
the sale and transfer of other personal property 12 as well as to
the implied warrants of one who transfers negotiable paper.' 3
Because of these objections, the Courts, although accepting
the letter of the rule, have shown a tendency to avoid its application where possible. Cases involving double forgeries, that is,
where the payee's name as well as that of the drawer is forged,
have presented such an opportunity. Most courts have allowed
the drawee bank to recover the payment made to the transmitting bank. Dean Ames justifies this by pointing out that
in the case of a forged indorsement the holder does not have
legal title to the instrument but that it belongs to the person
whose name was forged as indorser. Thus, any money collected
on the bill or note would be held in a constructive trust for the
benefit of the true owner, who could recover the money, as
14
money had and received to his use.
A few courts have allowed recovery in Price v. Neal
situations by applying Section 66 of the Negotiable Instruments
Law15 which provides: "Every indorser . . engages...
that if it be dishonored . . . he will pay the amount thereof to
the holder, or to any subsequent indorser who may be compelled
to pay it." However, the great weight of authority holds that
the drawee is not a holder in due course and therefore not
6
entitled to the benefit of the warranty.'
Some cases allowing recovery by the drawee bank reason
that since the whole doctrine of Price v. Neal is based on a
nHardy
Md.However,
563, 585 (1879).
'Young v.
v. Shesapeake
Cole, 3 Bing.Bank,
N. C. 51
724.
it is said that the

relationship of holder to drawee is altogether different than that of
vendor and vendee. See Ames, The Doctrine of Price v. Neal (1891)
4 Harv. L. Rev. 297.

Negotiable Instruments Law, Sec. 65-1.
"Supra note 12, 307.
Judge v. West Phila. Title & Trust Co., 68 Pa. Sup. Ct. 310,
315 (1916); Interstate Trust Co. v. United States Nat. Bank, 67 Colo.
6, 185 Pac. 260 (1919).
"'Louisa Nat. Bank v. Kentucky Nat. Bank, 239 Ky. 302, 39 S. W.
(2d) 497 (1931); First Nat. Bank v. United States Nat. Bank, 100 Or.
264, 197 Pac. 547 (1921).
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theory of negligence, contributing negligence of the transmitting bank should be a defense.' 7 The majority of courts hold
that since it is the general practice of bankers when purchasing
commercial paper, to make a reasonable inquiry as to the
identity of the payee, the indorsement of a purchasing bank,
not qualified or limited in any respect, amounts to a representation that such precaution has been taken.' s And, if the proper
precautions have not been taken and the indorsement is in fact
a forgery, the transmitting bank by its representation has misled
the drawee bank and lulled it into a less careful scrutiny of its
depositor's signature, thus making possible the success of the
fraud. 19 In order to remove a case from the doctrine of Pricev.
Neal and allow a recovery from the transmitting bank, it must
have failed to exercise the ordinary precautions of prudent
balking.-o
That the rule of Price v. Neal2 ' is both unjust and unsound
in principle is apparent from the attempts of the courts to
disregard it wherever possible, as in the case of double forgeries.
Moreover, the very number of the different explanations of this
exception leads one to distrust its validity. The writer believes
that although the courts have reached a just conclusion in the
double forgery cases they have fallen into error in attempting
to justify an "exception" to Price v. Neal which is itself an
exception. This so-called "exception" is in fact an application
of the general principles of law which imply a warranty as to
the existence and validity of property sold and which allow a
' Citizens' Bank of Fayette v. J. Blach & Sons, 228 Ala. 246, 153
So. 404 (1934); Hutcheson Hardware Co. v. Planter's State Bank,
26 Ga. App. 321, 105 S. E. 854 (1921); Swan-Edwards Co. v. Union
Say. Bank, 17 Ga. App. 572, 87 S. E. 825 (1916); Commercial & Say.
Bank Co. v. Citizens Nat. Bank of Franklin, 68 Ind. App. 417, 120
N. E. 670 (1918).
'Bank of Williamson v. McDowell County Bank, 66 W. Va. 545,
66 S. E. 761 (1910).
"Woods v. Colony Bank, 114 Ga. 683, 40 S.E. 720 (1902); People's Bank v. Franklin, 88 Tenn. 299, 12 S.W. 716 (1889).
"Citizens' Bank of Fayette v. J. Blach & Sons, 228 Ala. 246,
153 So. 404 (1934); Hutcheson Hardware Co. v. Planters' State Bank,
26 Ga. App. 321, 105 S.E. 854 (1921). The above cases show that
the rule applies to holders other than banks. Louisa Nat. Bank v.
Kentucky Nat. Bank, 239 Ky. 302, 39 S.W. (2d) 497 (1931); National
Bank v. Bangs, 106 Mass. 441, 8 Am. Rep. 349 (1871); First Nat.
Bank of Pukwana v. Brule Nat. Bank of Chamberlain, 41 S.D. 87,
168 N.W. 1054 (1918).
' First Bank of Lisbon v. Bank of Wyndmere, 15 N.D. 299, 108
N.W. 546 (1906).
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recovery on money paid under mistake of fact. Hence, when
the special circumstances which gave rise to the doctrine are
not present, that doctrine should not be applied and the case is
governed by the general principles of law to which Pricev. Neal
is an exception.
ROBERT S. HAmmOND

